EINFÜHLUNG JAKO SPOSÓB POZNANIA DRUGIEGO CZŁOWIEKA WEDŁUG EDYTY STEIN (2017)
The aim of this article, based mainly on Edith Stein's PhD thesis, is to present her theory of Einfühlung. The foundation of Edith Stein's philosophical thought was interest in human being. On Edmund Husserl's lectures she often heard that''an objective outer world could only be experienced intersubjectively.'' Therefore, an experience of other individuals is necessary. As the experience, called by Husserl empathy, had not been precisely defined, Stein decided to fulfil the gap and examine the concept. Stein defined empathy as a kind of acts in which one captures experiences of others. She meant that one can experience something that exists in another subject. In empathy the subject is not given experience from its source; there are two subjects taking part in that experience. Unlike in other conscious acts, here subjects are completely different from each other; they are not bound by identity-consciousness or continuity of experience. The article is divided into four parts. In the first one we examine the term Einfühlung and its translation into Polish. The second and the third part present the origins of the concept of empathy and the method to examine the issue respectively. The last and most extensive part is devoted to Edith Stein's theory of Einfühlung.
Keywords: filozofia